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Introduction and summary
Chicago is enlivened by the presence of many ethnic
neighborhoods, which are reflected in the citys small
business sector. This makes Chicago an excellent loca-
tion for studying small business finance in ethnic
communities. The topic is important because the
availability of capital may depend, in part, on ethnic
differences in factors such as the use of informal
financing (loans or gifts from family, friends, or busi-
ness associates) as opposed to formal financing from
banks and other financial institutions. We still have
much to learn about business access to capital in an
ethnic context. To shed some light on these matters,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and researchers
from the University of Chicago conducted surveys in
two Chicago neighborhoods, Little Village, a predomi-
nantly Hispanic community, and Chatham, a predomi-
nantly Black community. These communities were
chosen because they are distinct and well-recognized
ethnic neighborhoods with viable small business sec-
tors. Although most of the business owners inter-
viewed are either Black or Hispanic, other ethnic
groups are represented. One of the important features
of the surveys is that they shed light on informal and
formal sources of financing for both households and
businesses.
Small business access to capital is an important
policy issue because business owners may face
funding limits, known to economists as liquidity con-
straints. Although many observers might take funding
limits as self evident, studies have shown that liquid-
ity constraints affect entrepreneurs both upon start-up
and after the business is underway.1 These constraints
deter entry into self-employment and force would-be
owners to save for longer periods before launching a
business. The effects of start-up constraints extend
to ongoing businesses, because starting with more
capital increases an owners prospects of developing
a viable, growing business.2 Thus, entrepreneurs
ultimate success depends, in part, on how successful
they are in obtaining adequate capital and credit.
Loan guarantees and other programs offered by
the U.S. Small Business Administration are examples
of government policies aimed at increasing access to
credit for small businesses. Considering access to
capital and credit across neighborhoods and across
ethnic and racial groups raises other policy issues.
Owning a successful business builds personal wealth,
and self-employment historically has been an impor-
tant means for raising the economic status of some
ethnic groups. Promoting the success of small busi-
ness is an important part of community economic
development strategies, particularly for minority
neighborhoods that have suffered from a lack of
investment in the past. The purpose of the Community
Reinvestment Act is to encourage depository institu-
tions to help meet the credit needs of the communities
in which they operate, consistent with sound bank-
ing practices. While racial discrimination in residential
mortgage markets has been the subject of a number
of empirical studies, the effect of racial discrimination
on access to capital for minority business owners
and neighborhoods has received little attention to
date from researchers.347 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
In practice, owners meet the challenge of obtain-
ing capital to start and run their businesses by using
informal sources, as well as personal assets and loans
from formal sources. Thus, informal financing via net-
works can substitute for borrowing in the formal sector,
either because formal credit is not offered or because
informal financing is preferred. Credit offered by a
supplier, or trade credit, is another alternative to bor-
rowing from financial institutions. Businesses form
networks with their suppliers, and there may be an eth-
nic dimension to these networks, in that the ethnicity
of the supplier may matter for some transactions.
The main contribution of this article is to provide
information about the use of formal and informal
sources of financing. We confirm the importance of
personal savings and informal sources of credit in
meeting the entrepreneurs need for start-up funding.
There are pronounced ethnic differences in the
amount of start-up funding used by businesses in
the sample. In particular, we find that Black owners
start their businesses with significantly less capital
than Hispanic owners. This difference persists after
controlling for industry types and various measures
of human capital (such as the skills, abilities, and
training of business owners in the sample). The Black
Hispanic gap in total start-up funding is due to differ-
ent levels of nonpersonal sources of funding rather
than different amounts of personal savings put up
by the owner.
Turning to the use of trade credit, our most strik-
ing finding is that Black owners are much less likely
to owe their suppliers than owners in other ethnic
groups. This is partly because Black owners are less
likely to be offered credit by their suppliers, and be-
cause they are less likely to use trade credit if it is
offered. Trade credit can be a relatively expensive
source of ongoing credit, and it is not clear whether
using less trade credit indicates a constraint or a lack
of need. However, being offered credit by a supplier,
whether or not it is used, is clearly desirable. We find
that comparing the ethnicity of owners and their sup-
pliers does not explain ethnic differences in the use
of trade credit.
If these results hold beyond the Little Village and
Chatham neighborhoods, the findings have important
implications for understanding ethnic differences in
business survival and growth, the decision to become
self-employed, and income and wealth accumulation.
The importance of informal sources of funding sug-
gests that this type of funding has features that meet
the needs of small businesses in these communities.
Informal funding may be more flexible and better suited
to providing relatively modest amounts of capital
than the formal sector. However, an important advan-
tage of formal credit institutions is their ability to effi-
ciently mobilize large amounts of capital. Recognition
of the strengths of both informal and formal sources
of financing should be a part of programs and policies
aimed at encouraging the flow of capital to small
businesses.
In the next section, we briefly discuss some of
the theoretical issues involved in understanding the
use of formal and informal sources of capital and
credit. We hope that data from the Little Village and
Chatham studies may better inform the process of
building more useful theoretical models of financial
intermediation. Measurement of the use and nature of
informal networks is particularly important because,
as discussed below, the theoretical treatment of infor-
mal financing is still in its infancy.
Theoretical overview
Why do individuals borrow or save to
go into business?
In a world with perfect information, completely
specifiable and enforceable contracts, and no trans-
action costs, borrowing, lending, and insurance con-
tracts essentially allow a separation of household
consumption and saving decisions from occupational
choice and investment decisions. That is, a potential
business entrant would evaluate present and future
profitability, buy options against future contingencies,
and convert income streams into a single present
value number. That number, when compared with
alternatives, will determine for the individual which
occupation, technology, or type of enterprise to take
up, if any. That number plus existing wealth will deter-
mine, in turn, household consumption and saving
decisions. These two types of decisions are separate
from one another. In practice, however, household
consumption/saving decisions and occupation and
business investment decisions appear to be related,
very much so in the present study.
One branch of existing theory argues that credit
contracts for business start-ups and ongoing financ-
ing are very much limited. Some researchers, for exam-
ple, Bernhardt and Lloyd-Ellis (1993), assume that
there are no credit possibilities at all, in which case
start-ups and operations are limited to accumulated
saving and past profitability and to the entrepreneurs
own educational investments and experience. In other
cases, such as Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Hart and
Moore (1997), and Banarjee and Neumann (1993),
acquisition of some credit is possible, but it is limited,
for example, to some multiple of accumulated wealth
or available collateral, as in the use of personal collat-
eral or trade credit backed by the goods supplied.48 Economic Perspectives
More recent studies describe in greater detail
how credit markets function and the impediments to
exchange that limit the amount or type of credit avail-
able. Some researchers emphasize moral hazard prob-
lems, that repayment of principal and interest in times
of stress leaves the household with little or no liquid-
ity. Essentially the lender, for example, a bank, takes
so much of project returns away from the borrower/
entrepreneur that it is not worthwhile for the borrow-
er/entrepreneur to work hard or exercise appropriate
diligence. Yet the rational lender can figure all this
out and, with ultimate profitability in doubt, will lend
even less, if not nothing at all. Those who do manage
to borrow, or those relying exclusively on savings,
may choose technologies or businesses with lower
variance but lower mean returns. For example, see
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Morduch (1990), and Lehnert,
Ligon, and Townsend (1999).
Other recent studies, for example, Kehoe and
Levine (1996) and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (1997),
identify willingness to repay as the potential problem.
In this scenario, credit and insurance markets might
seem to operate well over the realizations of a broad
range of economic and social risk factors. But, ironi-
cally, the temptation to renege when a business does
well would limit credit overall.
These kinds of obstacles to the smooth operation
of credit markets clearly can make a difference in occu-
pational choice. Yet the story doesnt stop there. Lim-
ited entry can mean that successful entrants accrue
unusually large profits. Some will reinvest those profits
in their businesses. They were, after all, relatively un-
derfinanced in the first place. The economy-wide cap-
ital stock will grow. Others may be stuck in low-wage
labor markets, sometimes as employees of the suc-
cessful small business enterprises. This can be a
nontrivial source of economy-wide employment. Thus,
we might see growth with increasing inequality, even
within ethnically homogenous communities. The level
of inequality, the overall rate of growth, and the level
of employment are all functions of the nature of the
credit markets. In other words, improvements in credit
markets could have beneficial implications for growth,
employment, and the distribution of income. (See
Lehnert, 1998.)
Why does intermediation arise, and how do
we distinguish formal intermediaries from
informal networks?
It is by no means obvious why institutions arise
that specialize in lending and other insurance services.
In a world of perfect information, individuals would
simply write contracts directly with each other. Theories
of intermediation typically depend on information be-
ing available only at a cost: Intermediaries arise
either because they minimize the amount of informa-
tion production (that is, not all individuals need to do
it) or because they have lower costs of intermediation
production than other agents. Key papers in this field
include Diamond (1984) and Krasa and Villamil (1991).
However, these studies force a formal structure on
the intermediary by allowing at most one central
point of information collection. They do not distin-
guish convincingly between a formal structure and
an informal network linking individuals (see Bond,
1999), although there are no established theoretical
reasons for supposing that when intermediation exists
it will take the form of a formal institution. Boyd and
Prescott (1986) is an important exception.
Recent work continues to try to remedy that defi-
ciency. The idea is to model networks as groups of
households or business that have some natural or
acquired advantage relative to a formal financial inter-
mediary. Some of these models emphasize a priori
selection, that is, individual joint liability for loans
would screen out bad apples, or individuals choose
to link to others from whom they can learn. See, for
example, Rai (1996), Becker and Murphy (1994),
Ghatak (1998), and Varian (1990). Other models empha-
size better internal risk contingencies, better informa-
tion on project returns or underlying effort, better
internal enforcement of implicit or explicit agreements,
or some combination of the three. See Prescott and
Townsend (1996), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990),
and Itoh (1991).
We are only beginning to understand from theory
how networks might operate, but it seems clear that
networks can be important for the welfare of their
members. Networks can be important alternatives to
more formal and more distant institutions. Another
possibility is suggested by theory: Institutions can
lend in an evident, measurable way to a handful of
individuals, yet as network members, the intermediary
and its funds now make their way to the larger com-
munity. These theories do suggest the importance of
measurement, specifically measurement of the use
and nature of networks.
Neighborhood and survey description
Little Village, on the southwest side of Chicago,
became a predominantly Hispanic area in the 1970s,
due to a substantial inflow of immigrants, mostly of
Mexican origin, during the 1960s. As of the 1990
Census, the community had a population of 81,155
and a median family income of $23,259. Chatham, on
the citys south side, became a predominantly Black49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
community during the 1950s (Chicago Fact Book
Consortium, 1995). In 1990, Chatham had a population
of 36,779 and a median family income of $29,258.
The household and business survey instruments
were developed for a multi-ethnic survey that was
implemented for the Little Village study and adapted,
with very minor modifications, for the Chatham
project.4 In both communities, the survey universe
was constructed by canvassing and enumerating all
identifiable existing businesses. A stratified random
sample was then drawn. In Little Village, relatively
common businesses (including eating and drinking
places, auto repair shops, and hair salons) were drawn
at a rate of 35 percent; relatively uncommon business
(including bridal shops, bakeries, iron works, and fac-
tories) were drawn at a rate of 100 percent; and all
other businesses were drawn at a rate of 50 percent.
Relatively common businesses in Chatham (including
eating places and hair salons) were drawn at a rate of
22.5 percent; and all other businesses were drawn at
a rate of 45 percent. In both surveys, medical and
legal professionals were excluded from the sample,
on the grounds that the educational requirements for
these fields result in entrance and financing decisions
that have little in common with those of other small
businesses. Field staff, bilingual in the case of Little
Village, contacted the businesses in the selected
samples for an interview that required about one-
and-a-half hours. The response rates were 70 percent
for Little Village and 57 percent for Chatham. About
one-third of all enumerated businesses were inter-
viewed in Little Village and one-quarter in Chatham.5
Business and owner characteristics
Table 1 shows the types of businesses by ethnic
group. (Asian owners are primarily Korean, and Other
is made up of owners from the Middle East, India, and
Pakistan.)6 For example, column 1 of table 1 indicates
that 5.3 percent of all the businesses in the sample
are in the manufacturing and wholesale category. For
all ethnic groups combined, the bulk of the firms fall
into some form of retail or service sector. Black owners
are relatively concentrated in the service sector. Man-
ufacturing firms are more common for White owners
than for other groups, and Asians have a marked
concentration in other retail. Hispanic firms are rela-
tively balanced across industry types, with no single
category containing more than 25 percent of the total
(although total retail accounts for 68.9 percent of His-
panic businesses). Franchises are relatively
uncommon and make up 5.8 percent of the entire
sample. The average age of businesses for all groups
is about nine years, and firms owned by Blacks (13
years) and Whites (16 years) tend to be older than
the firms in the remaining groups. Most firms in these
communities employ relatively few workers; the aver-
age is 4.5 employees for businesses in all groups.
White-owned firms and, to a lesser extent, Black-
owned firms tend to employ more workers on average
than firms in the other groups.
TABLE 1
Characteristics of businesses in Little Village and Chatham, percent
All Hispanic Black White Asian  Other
Manufacturing/wholesale/
construction/transportation 5.3 6.6 1.8 22.0 2.3 7.9
Retail total 64.3 68.9 49.2 54.2 92.8 89.0
Eating/drinking places 16.8 23.6 11.4 16.6 5.1 20.5
Food stores 11.1 13.3 8.4 3.9 2.6 26.4
Auto service/sales 8.0 11.0 6.0 5.5 2.3 9.9
Other retail 28.4 21.0 23.4 28.2 82.8 32.2
Business/personal services 30.6 24.6 49.1 23.9 4.9 3.1
Franchise 5.8 5.3 6.2 7.7 0.0 13.4
Age of business in years 9.2 6.9 12.6 16.3 4.2 5.8
Number of employees 4.5 3.9 5.1 9.2 2.3 3.6
Observations 416 183 148 25 34 25
Notes: These results are weighted to reflect sample stratification. Retail total is the sum of eating/drinking places, food stores,
auto service/sales, and other retail. The Other category is made up of owners from the Middle East, India, and Pakistan.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1993–94, Little Village
Survey and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1997–98, Chatham Survey.50 Economic Perspectives
Table 2 shows selected demographic and human
capital variables. The average firm owner for all groups
is about 47 years old, with Black and White owners
tending to be a bit older than owners in the remaining
groups. About one-third of all owners are women;
Hispanic and, especially, Black owners are more likely
to be women. The majority of business owners are
married, 72 percent overall; Black proprietors are
somewhat less likely to be married than those in the
other groups.
Most business owners are at least high school
graduates, and about one-third have a college degree.
However, educational attainment varies across racial/
ethnic groups. The proportion of Hispanics in the
sample who do not have a high school diploma (42.5
percent) is more than twice as high as the proportion
for Blacks (18.1 percent), the group with the next
highest figure. Hispanic owners are the least likely to
have a college degree (only 18.1 percent have a degree),
followed by Black owners (34.9 percent). Hispanic
owners (71.2 percent) are less likely to be moderately
or extremely proficient in English than the Asian (89.7
percent) and Other groups (91.1 percent). Finally, an
appreciable proportion of the entrepreneurs owned a
business previously, ranging from 25.7 percent for
Blacks to 51.0 percent for Asians.
For comparison, table 3 provides selected figures
from the 1992 Characteristics of Business Owners
Survey (CBO), a national survey produced by the
Bureau of the Census. Of course, when comparing
these results, we must keep in mind important differ-
ences in survey design. For example, the CBO survey,
based on tax returns, includes home-based businesses,
which are not included in the Little Village and
Chatham neighborhood surveys. As mentioned earlier,
our neighborhood surveys also exclude legal and
medical services. Finally, the CBO survey categorizes
the data differently. Thus, table 3 reports results for
Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans, and
White males.
A comparison of tables 1, 2, and 3 shows that
retail businesses are much more common in the Little
Village and Chatham surveys than in the CBO survey.
This may well be due to the CBOs inclusion of home-
based businesses, which are unlikely to be retail.
Franchise businesses are somewhat more common in
the neighborhood sample (5.8 percent) than in the
CBO sample (3.1 percent). The proportion of owners
who are married is slightly higher in the CBO survey
(77.7 percent) than in the neighborhood surveys (72.0
percent). Hispanic owners in Little Village have less
education than Hispanics in the CBO survey. In Little
Village, 42.5 percent of business owners do not have
at least a high school diploma, compared with 27.2
percent for the CBO survey; similarly, the proportions
for high school and college graduates are lower in the
Little Village sample than in the CBO Hispanic sample.
We see the opposite pattern for Blacks, with Black
owners in Chatham more likely to have a college de-
gree or beyond (34.9 percent) than Blacks in the CBO
sample (26.7 percent). Finally, owners in each of the
ethnic groups in Little Village and Chatham are substan-
tially more likely to have previously owned a business
than owners in the CBO sample.
TABLE 2
Characteristics of owners in Little Village and Chatham, percent
All Hispanic Black  White Asian Other
Average age, years 46.9 42.3 52.5 54.3 45.3 41.4
Female 33.0 31.4 43.1 13.2 21.8 16.8
Married 72.0 81.0 59.3 74.0 80.8 76.4
No high school diploma 26.1 42.5 18.1 8.6 3.3 13.1
High school diploma or
   some college 42.9 40.6 47.0 27.1 45.2 42.1
College degree or beyond 32.0 18.8 34.9 70.2 51.5 44.8
Proficient in English 86.5 71.2 100.0 100.0 89.7 91.1
Previously owned business 31.1 32.1 25.7 39.2 51.0 24.0
Observations 416 183 148 25 34 25
Note: These results are weighted to reflect sample stratification.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1993–94,
Little Village Survey and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1997–98, Chatham Survey.51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Ethnic differences in start-up financing
Levels of funding
An important result of our research is that His-
panic- and especially Black-owned firms have lower
levels of total start-up financing than firms owned by
individuals in the other racial/ethnic groups.7 Table 4
presents descriptive statistics for total start-up funds.
The mean amounts are much higher than the medians,
indicating that a few businesses with large amounts
of start-up funding are pulling the mean away from
the median. Thus, a comparison of mean amounts
would put a great deal of weight on a few observa-
tions involving large dollar amounts. We avoid this
problem by recognizing that start-up funding follows
an approximately log-normal distribution. Accordingly,
table 4 reports the means of the natural logarithm of
start-up costs after conversion to dollar amounts.
Comparing the means of logged start-up funds con-
verted to dollars, we see that the average start-up
funding for our sample was fairly modest at $14,737.
Further, the amount of start-up funds varies widely
by ethnic group. Hispanics ($13,164) and Blacks
($10,812) start their businesses with lower amounts
of funds on average than the remaining groups.8
Table 4 also shows that the distinction between
firms started from scratch by the current owner and
those that were bought or acquired may be important.
The level of start-up funding for owners in all ethnic
groups that started their business from scratch is
only $10,743, compared with $27,340 for firms that
were bought or acquired. This gap holds for each
of the ethnic groups. The ethnic differences noted
above also hold. That is, Hispanic- and Black-owned
firms have lower levels of funding than the other
groups for businesses started from scratch and for
businesses bought or acquired. In both cases, Black
owners start their businesses with about 25 percent
less funding than Hispanic owners.9
These results are incomplete, in that other factors
beyond ethnicity may affect the level of start-up
funding. For example, a grocery store with a require-
ment for an extensive stock of inventory on the
shelves will likely require more start-up funding than
a firm that provides a service largely based on the
human capital embodied in the owner and key employ-
ees. The next step is to control for some differences
in demographics, human capital, and industry type to
see what ethnic differences emerge.10
To account for systematic differences in the
 required levels of start-up costs across industries,
we use a number of industry indicator variables,
ranging from manufacturing and wholesaling to busi-
ness and personal services. The ease with which busi-
ness assets acquired at start-up may be used for
collateral may also vary by industry type, which might
affect the amount of start-up capital that can be ob-
tained. 11 Human capital differences might also account
for differences in start-up funding. We would expect
TABLE 3
Characteristics of businesses and owners from the 1992 Characteristics of Business Owners Survey
 (percent)
Asian, White
All Hispanic Black Native American male
Manufacturing/wholesale/
construction/transportation 20.8 23.5 17.8 15.1 26.1
Retail 14.4 14.0 14.0 21.9 11.8
Business/personal services 56.4 51.4 60.2 55.8 52.8
Agriculture/unclassified 8.5 11.1 8.0 7.2 9.2
Franchise 3.1 2.8 4.1 4.8 2.9
Married 77.7 75.1 65.8 80.9 80.4
No high school diploma 10.0 27.2 17.8 12.5 9.5
High school diploma or
some college 52.9 50.1 55.7 39.4 51.7
College degree or beyond 37.2 22.7 26.7 47.8 38.6
Previously owned business 23.9 17.9 13.5 28.4 26.7
Notes: Figures for the All category include data for women-owned businesses, which are not reported here.
Percentages are calculated excluding non-responses. The survey universe includes entities filing tax reports
as sole proprietorships, partnerships, or subchapter S corporations.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1992, Characteristics of Business Owners Survey.52 Economic Perspectives
that more qualified entrepreneurs, all else being equal,
would be able to attract more funding. The personal
wealth available to entrepreneurs to start a business
would also depend, in part, on their human capital.
The variables we use to account for this human capital
include education, English proficiency, previous expe-
rience owning a business, and age at start-up. We
include a variable that measures how long ago the
owner started the business to account for the possi-
bility that there has been a shift over time in the level
of start-up costs.12 Indicator variables for ethnicity
and gender capture ethnic and gender differences not
due to the industry and human capital variables.
Table 5 reports the ordinary least square (OLS)
regression results for logged total start-up costs for
firms started from scratch. To illustrate the economic
effect of the regression coefficients, we calculate esti-
mated levels of start-up funding for each ethnic group
using the following baseline characteristics: eating/
drinking place, high school education, proficient in
English, no previous experience as an owner, aged 37
years, male, and business started 12 years ago. For
example, the estimated start-up cost for a Hispanic
owner with these baseline characteristics is $20,414.13
For owners in the other groups, the estimated costs
are: $11,104 for Blacks, $54,564 for Whites, $26,921
for Asians, and $30,479 for Others.14 Thus, a Black
owner with the baseline characteristics starts a busi-
ness with an estimated 46 percent smaller pool of
funds than a comparable Hispanic. A White owner
with the baseline characteristics starts with 167 per-
cent more funding than a comparable Hispanic; an
Asian owner starts with 32 percent more; and an
owner in the Other category starts with 49 percent
more.15 These results show that the raw differences
in start-up funding shown in table 4 are still present
after accounting for industry type and several mea-
sures of human capital. However, table 5 indicates the
differences between Hispanics and White, Asian, and
Other owners are not statistically significant at con-
ventional significance levels.16
The regression results in table 5 also show that
women, owners who do not have a high school diplo-
ma, and owners who lack proficiency in English have
lower start-up funding, whereas those who previous-
ly owned a business start the current business with
more funds. With regard to the economic importance
of these differences, note that the coefficient estimates
for all these effects (ranging from 0.57 to 0.70) are
roughly comparable to the difference between Hispanic
and Black owners. Thus, the differences in the esti-
mated dollar amount of start-up costs due to these
TABLE 4
Descriptive statistics for total start-up funds, in 1996 dollars
All Hispanic Black White Asian Other
All businesses
Mean 48,503 33,413 42,555 220,435 51,015 71,956
Median 15,650 12,629 12,653 125,391 34,054 42,477
Mean of logged funds
converted to dollars 14,737 13,164 10,812 84,112 22,663 35,226
Observations 391 176 140 18 34 22
Started by owner
Mean 35,201 26,590 34,357 158,561 50,792 59,939
Median 11,328 10,960 11,082 41,383 28,512 27,145
Mean of logged funds
converted to dollars 10,743 10,666 8,071 72,782 16,724 21,613
Observations 257 131 89 4 22 11
Bought or acquired
Mean 74,507 53,563 56,407 237,473 51,474 88,331
Median 31,497 31,489 17,049 133,915 34,055 67,906
Mean of logged funds
converted to dollars 27,340 24,500 17,717 87,531 42,386 68,541
Observations 134 45 51 14 12 11
Notes: These results are weighted to reflect sample stratification.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1993–94,
Little Village Survey and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1997–98, Chatham Survey.53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
factors would be roughly comparable to the Hispanic
Black difference discussed above.
Table 6 reports the OLS regression results for
logged total start-up costs for businesses that were
bought or acquired. Again, we use the regression
results to illustrate ethnic differences by calculating
estimated start-up costs. Here the start-up cost for a
Hispanic owner with the same baseline characteristics
as above is $23,119. The estimated start-up costs for
other owners with the baseline characteristics are as
follows: $10,091 for Blacks, $43,792 for Whites, $50,474
for Asians, and $34,168 for Others. Thus, a Black
owner with the baseline characteristics starts a busi-
ness with an estimated 56 percent lower level of funding
than a comparable Hispanic owner. By
comparison, a White owner starts with
89 percent more funding than a compara-
ble Hispanic; an Asian owner starts with
118 percent more; and an owner in the
Other category starts with 48 percent
more. As in the case of businesses started
from scratch, for acquired firms the raw dif-
ferences in start-up funding shown in
table 4 remain after accounting for indus-
try type and several measures of human
capital. Table 6 shows that the differences
between Hispanics and White, Asian, and
Other owners are not statistically signifi-
cant at conventional significance levels.17
Table 6 also shows that owners with
a college degree buy or acquire their
businesses with more start-up funding
than the baseline owner, which is not the
case for businesses started from scratch.
Owners who lack proficiency in English
begin with less funding.18 Also unlike
the results for businesses started from
scratch, the results for businesses bought
or acquired show no funding disadvan-
tage for women.19
To explore the ethnic differences
noted above, we look at the sources of
start-up funding used by owners in start-
ing their businesses. We group the fund-
ing sources listed in the surveys into
four categories. Personal savings repre-
sent entrepreneurs personal resources;
informal funding includes loans, gifts,
or equity from family, friends, or busi-
ness associates; loans from financial in-
stitutions make up the formal financing
category; and miscellaneous sources,
including trade credit, are included in the
other sources category.
We analyze the amount of funding from personal
savings in a similar way to the total start-up costs dis-
cussed above. That is, we run a regression analysis,
including variables for ethnicity, industry types, and
various measures of human capital. The results of
these regressions, not reported here, show that the
difference between personal funding provided by
Black and Hispanic owners is small and statistically
insignificant both for businesses started from scratch
and businesses bought or acquired.20 In addition, the
results provide no evidence that Black and Hispanic
owners use significantly less personal funding than
owners in the other ethnic groups.21 The results of
TABLE 5
Regression results for total start-up funds:




Black owner –0.6089 0.2856**
White owner 0.9831 0.8929
Asian owner 0.2766 0.4592
Owner in remaining ethnic groups 0.4007 0.5544
All other retail –0.2070 0.3679
Manufacturing/wholesale –0.7959 0.5970
Grocery and other food store 0.5905 0.4356
Auto/gas sales or service –0.4338 0.4963
Business and personal services –0.2052 0.3826
Less than high school degree –0.6377 0.2779**
College degree or beyond –0.0067 0.2749
Proficient in English 0.5738 0.3141*
Previously owned a business 0.5707 0.2347**
Owner’s age at start-up 0.0041 0.0117
Female owner –0.6951 0.2460**
Years since start-up –0.0055 0.0132
Number of observations 253
R2 0.1697
Adjusted R2 0.1134
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Notes: This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results
for the logged level of total start-up costs. The omitted ethnic category is
Hispanic; the omitted industry category is eating/drinking place; and the
omitted education category is high school diploma or some college. Thus,
the coefficients for the other ethnic groups measure differences in start-up
funding relative to Hispanics, the coefficients for the other industry types
measure differences relative to eating/drinking places, and the coefficients
for the other education levels measure differences relative to a high school
diploma or some college.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago and University of Chicago, 1993–94, Little Village Survey and
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1997–98,
Chatham Survey.54 Economic Perspectives
similar regressions on the level of start-up funding
provided by sources other than personal savings
show that Black owners begin their businesses with
less nonpersonal funding than Hispanic owners.22
Proportions of funding
To complement the view provided by our analysis
of funding levels from each source above, we examine
the proportion of total funding from each source.
We calculated the proportion of funding from each
source for every owner in the sample, then averaged
the results. For example, the first entry in table 7 shows
that personal savings, on average, are the most impor-
tant source of funding64 percent of total funding for
all enterprises. There are marked ethnic differences in
the proportional use of personal savings,
with Hispanic, Black, and Asian owners
tending to depend more on personal
savings than White and Other owners.
Highlighting the importance of personal
savings, 55 percent of Black owners,
51 percent of Hispanic owners, and 45
percent of Asian owners in the sample
started their businesses using only per-
sonal savings. By comparison, 36 per-
cent of Other owners and 19 percent of
White owners depended solely on per-
sonal savings.
As reported in table 7, informal financ-
ing is the second most important source
of funding, at 18.9 percent for all firms.
Black and Hispanic owners depend less
on informal financing than owners in the
other ethnic categories. Formal financing
from banks and other formal lenders, at
10.5 percent, is less important for all firms,
on average, than personal and informal
funding, except for White owners. Formal
financing accounts for a relatively high
proportion of funding for White and
Other owners. The last funding category,
other sources, is the least important for
all firms at 6.5 percent. Hispanic and
Asian owners, for whom formal financing
provides the smallest proportion of start-
up funding, use other sources more than
White and Black owners.
Focusing on Black and Hispanic
differences, table 7 shows that Black
owners begin their businesses with a
somewhat higher proportion of start-up
funding from personal resources (69.6
percent) than Hispanic owners (66.0 per-
cent). Black-owned businesses begin
with a lower proportion of start-up funding from in-
formal sources (14.9 percent) than Hispanic-owned
businesses (19.0 percent).23 Black owners also start
their businesses with a lower proportion of funding
from other sources (3.5 percent) than Hispanic own-
ers (7.4 percent). However, the average proportion of
formal funding for Black-owned businesses (12.1 per-
cent) is higher than that of Hispanic-owned businesses
(7.2 percent).24
How does this evidence relate to the regression
results that Black owners begin their businesses with
less funding than Hispanic owners, both for businesses
started from scratch and businesses that are bought
or acquired? Regression analysis of the funding from
TABLE 6
Regression results for total start-up funds:




Black owner –0.8290 0.4026**
White owner 0.6387 0.5750
Asian owner 0.7808 0.5605
Owner in remaining ethnic groups 0.3906 0.5963
All other retail –0.8675 0.4693*
Manufacturing/wholesale 1.0028 0.6152*
Grocery and other food store 0.5157 0.4872
Auto/gas sales or service 1.0639 0.6125*
Business and personal services 0.3859 0.4521
Less than high school diploma 0.4047 0.3554
College degree or beyond 1.0595 0.3447**
Proficient in English 0.8768 0.4927*
Previously owned a business 0.1239 0.3107
Owner’s age at start-up 0.0088 0.0151
Female owner 0.3719 0.3243
Years since start-up 0.0329 0.0167*
Number of observations 130
R2 0.3555
Adjusted R2 0.2642
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Notes: This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results
for the logged level of total start-up costs. The omitted ethnic category is
Hispanic; the omitted industry category is eating/drinking place; and the
omitted education category is high school diploma or some college. Thus,
the coefficients for the other ethnic groups measure differences in start-up
funding relative to Hispanics, the coefficients for the other industry types
measure differences relative to eating/drinking places, and the coefficients
for the other education levels measure differences relative to a high school
diploma or some college.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago and University of Chicago, 1993–94, Little Village Survey and
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1997–98,
Chatham Survey.55 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
personal savings shows that Black and Hispanic
owners use similar amounts of personal savings to
start their businesses. This result suggests that we
must look elsewhere to explain the gap in start-up
funding. Unfortunately, the sample size and the rela-
tive infrequency with which the remaining sources of
funding (informal, formal, and other sources) are used
do not allow us to establish conclusively how each
source contributes to the BlackHispanic funding
gap. However, some patterns emerge from the average
proportions of start-up costs provided by each source
of funding, as reported in table 7.
For example, table 7 shows that, on average,
Black owners use a higher proportion of formal financ-
ing and lower proportions of informal and other sources
of funding than Hispanic owners. This evidence sug-
gests that less use of funding from informal and other
sources plays an important role in accounting for lower
levels of start-up funding for Black-owned businesses
relative to Hispanic-owned businesses.
Despite the differences in funding between Black
and Hispanic businesses, these businesses share
some characteristics that differentiate them from oth-
er enterprises. For example, as shown in table 4 and
by the regression analysis, Black and Hispanic owners
start their businesses with less funding than owners
in the other ethnic groups. Black and Hispanic owners
also depend on personal savings for a higher propor-
tion of their start-up funding (table 7) and are more
likely to use personal savings as their only source
of start-up funding.
Interpreting the start-up results
Evidence from other studies indicates that the
amount of financial capital available at start-up is
important, because more capital increases an enter-
prises chances of survival. To explore whether start-up
funding is important for the businesses in Little Village
and Chatham, we compare ongoing performance,
measured by annual profit, to the level of start-up
capital. Since profit will likely depend on other factors
beside start-up capital, we also include variables for
ethnic group, industry type, education, and business
age in the regression analysis. We include business
age as a control because we expect the impact of
start-up funding on future profit to vary with time.
Our analysis indicates that (depending on the func-
tional form) the yearly rate of return on another dollar
of start-up capital ranges from 5 percent to 20 percent
at the sample means.25 This result suggests that the
quantity of start-up capital matters for the future per-
formance of the businesses in our sample.
There are a variety of reasons owners in different
ethnic groups might begin their businesses with differ-
ent levels of funding. Possibly, there are cultural differ-
ences in attitudes toward risk, or some groups may
lack experience or certain business skills and simply
choose to begin small and learn through doing. Never-
theless, the evidence suggests that some owners are
constrained in the amount of start-up funding that
they are able to obtain and are forced to begin their
businesses with less than the optimal amount of capi-
tal. Ethnic differences in the level of start-up funding
could be the result of differences in personal wealth,
or they could be due to some groups facing greater
funding constraints than others.
Many of the owners in our sample who began
their businesses using only personal resources did
not feel constrained by a lack of access to other
sources of funding. Of those who started with only
personal funds, 65.1 percent of Hispanic owners and
52.6 percent of Black owners cited lack of need as
the reason that they did not seek loans or other finan-
cial assistance. Some owners wanted outside sources
TABLE 7
Average proportion of start-up costs by source of funds, percent
All Hispanic Black White Asian Other
Personal 64.0 66.0 69.6 33.2 60.1 44.2
Informal 18.9 19.0 14.9 26.5 23.4 28.9
Formal 10.5 7.2 12.1 35.4 3.1 18.5
Other sources 6.5 7.4 3.5 4.8 13.4 8.4
Observations 386 176 136 18 33 22
Notes: These results are weighted to reflect sample stratification. Numbers in columns may not total to
100 percent due to rounding.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago,
1993–94, Little Village Survey and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago,
1997–98, Chatham Survey.56 Economic Perspectives
of funding3.5 percent of Hispanics and 11.8 percent
of Blacks actively tried to get financial assistance.
The remainder, 31.5 percent of Hispanic owners and
35.6 percent of Black owners, were discouraged from
asking for assistance for some reason.
To the extent that funding constraints are impor-
tant for some owners in Little Village and Chatham,
then start-up costs will depend on an entrepreneurs
personal wealth. More wealth allows more personal
funding of the business. More wealth also means more
collateral for borrowing, so it potentially increases the
amount of borrowed funds available at start-up.26
Unfortunately, the survey results do not provide direct
evidence of the owners personal wealth at start-up,
so we are not able to test directly for the effects of
wealth on start-up funding.27 Thus, the observed
ethnic differences in the level of start-up funding
may be the result of differences in wealth not cap-
tured by the human capital variables included in our
regressions. Given that the literature shows that
Whites tend to have more wealth than Blacks with
similar levels of human capital, it is not surprising
that our results indicate that White owners begin
their businesses with more start-up funding than
Black owners. However, differences in wealth between
Blacks and other minority groups have not been as
much studied. In particular, there is little reason to
believe that Hispanics have more personal wealth
than Blacks for a given level of human capital.28 Thus,
it is doubtful that wealth differences explain our cen-
tral finding that Black owners begin their businesses
with less start-up funding than Hispanic owners for
a given level of human capital.
Although not conclusive, the available evidence
suggests that Black owners use less financing from
informal sources than Hispanic owners. An interpre-
tation of the funding shortfall that is consistent with
the evidence presented here is that Black owners, for
some reason, have less access to networks that pro-
vide informal financing.
Trade credit and other ongoing financing
Once in operation, a business may need ongoing
financing to meet working capital needs or to expand.
Trade credit is an important source of ongoing credit;
according to a national survey, 60.8 percent of small
businesses in 1993 had outstanding trade credit and
trade credit accounted for 31.3 percent of total debt.29
As shown in table 8, trade credit is widely used by
businesses in Little Village and Chatham, with 38.2
percent of the respondents owing money to one or
more suppliers.
Whether or not a business uses trade credit de-
pends on the supplier as well as the business owner,
because the supplier must be willing to extend credit.
Presumably, a supplier would weigh the costs and
benefits of extending trade credit to a particular busi-
ness rather than demanding cash. There are a number
of reasons suppliers may have advantages relative to
other lenders in supplying credit to their customers.
For example, suppliers may extend credit to attract
future orders, especially from growing businesses.
Suppliers may also have an advantage in assessing
credit risk, monitoring the borrower, or liquidating
collateral.30 Table 8 shows that 56.7 percent of the
businesses in the sample have at least one supplier
who offers credit, indicating that a substantial number
of them do not have access to trade credit. A majority
(66.6 percent) of the businesses that are offered trade
credit make use of it, and owed a supplier at the time
of the survey. The median amount owed was $3,176.
There are substantial ethnic differences in the
use of trade credit. As shown in table 8, the proportion
of Black owners who owe a supplier (20.1 percent) is
much lower than that of the other ethnic groups,
whereas the proportion of Asian owners (66.7 percent)
is relatively high. Using the proportion of Hispanic
owners owing suppliers (44.4 percent) as a basis for
comparison, the HispanicBlack and HispanicAsian
differences in the use of trade credit are statistically
significant at conventional levels.31
These ethnic differences are due, in part, to dif-
ferences in the proportion of owners in the various
groups that are offered credit by suppliers. Hispanic
(57.6 percent) and, especially, Black owners (44.8 per-
cent) are less likely to be offered credit by a supplier
than other owners. Again, using the proportion of
Hispanic owners who are offered credit as a basis of
comparison, the differences between Hispanic owners
and the remaining ethnic groups are statistically signif-
icant at the 10 percent level.32 Thus, part of the reason
Black and Hispanic owners are less likely to owe a
supplier than owners in other ethnic groups is that they
are less likely to be offered trade credit by a supplier.
Once trade credit is offered, business owners
must decide whether to take advantage of it. Table 8
shows that about two-thirds of all the businesses
that are offered credit owe a supplier, confirming that
trade credit is widely used when available. Among
businesses that are offered trade credit, Black-owned
enterprises are less likely to owe a supplier (44.9 per-
cent) than the other groups. For the other ethnic
groups, the range is from 64.3 percent for White
owners to 83.6 percent for Asian owners.33 Note that
Hispanic owners tend to use trade credit when it is
availableat 75.3 percent, Hispanic owners lag only
Asian owners.57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
These findings indicate that the relatively low
proportion of Black owners who owe a supplier (20.1
percent) reflects both that they are less likely to be
offered trade credit and that they are less likely to take
on trade credit when it is available. By contrast, Asian
owners have a high propensity to owe a supplier
(66.7 percent), because they are often offered credit
and they tend to use it when it is offered. Hispanic
owners are an intermediate case in that, like Black
owners, they are less likely to be offered credit than
owners in the other ethnic groups, but they tend to
use it when it is offered.
Compared with the widespread use of trade credit,
a relatively small proportion of businesses (17.6 per-
cent) used other ongoing credit at the time of the sur-
vey (see table 8). This proportion is relatively low
compared with the use of formal credit in a national
sample of small businesses in 1993. Even if we only
consider businesses with fewer than two employees
from that national sample (to make it more comparable
to the neighborhood sample), the results indicate that
formal credit is used by 41.9 percent of small busi-
nesses.34 Ethnic differences are not that apparent in
the prevalence of other ongoing credit, except that
Asian owners are more likely than other owners to
have creditors other than suppliers.35 Most of the
lenders that extend this ongoing credit are part of
the formal sector; 69.4 percent of all lenders listed by
respondents are financial institutions, primarily com-
mercial banks.36 This finding holds in general for busi-
nesses in both Little Village and Chatham. However,
there are some ethnic differences in the sources of
ongoing credit. Credit cards, whether issued to an in-
dividual or a business entity, can be used for business
purposes. The use of credit cards is more common
among Black owners35.4 percent of their lenders
are credit card issuerswhereas no credit card issuers
are mentioned by Hispanic owners. Loans from indi-
viduals, clearly an informal source of funds, are found
in Little Village; 16.7 percent of the lenders listed by
Hispanic owners are identified as individuals. By con-
trast, no individual lenders are identified in Chatham.
This finding echoes the evidence that Black owners
are less likely to obtain funds from informal sources
during start-up than owners in the other ethnic groups.
Interpreting the ongoing credit results
We observe some patterns in these results. Be-
cause trade credit can be a relatively expensive source
of ongoing credit, high levels of trade credit have
been used in the literature as an indicator that firms
are constrained from borrowing at the lower interest
rates available from financial institutions (Petersen
and Rajan, 1994). Thus, it is not clear whether using
less trade credit indicates a constraint or a lack of
need. However, being offered credit by a supplier,
whether or not it is used, is clearly desirable as a
potential source of funds. In addition, an owners
attitude toward risk and desire to expand the business
may have a bearing on how much ongoing credit is
demanded.
A possible explanation for these patterns is that
ethnic groups may differ in their access to ethnic net-
works formed by businesses and their suppliers. To
test this explanation, we look at the ethnic relation-
ship between businesses and their suppliers. Since a
given business may have up to three suppliers listed
on the survey, we look at each combination of business
and supplier.37 We find that Asian owners are more
likely to deal with suppliers of the same ethnicity;
46.8 percent of their suppliers are also Asians. This
proportion is lower for Hispanic (31.5 percent), Black
(27.5 percent), and Other (20.5 percent) owners.
This finding might suggest that the relatively
high proportion of Asian owners who use trade credit
is due to some unique features of an ethnic supply
network. For example, involvement in an ethnic net-
work may provide superior information on which to
base credit decisions, give more incentive for each
side to carry out their contractual obligations, or aid
in monitoring the credit relationship.
However, looking beyond the ethnic identity of
a given supplier undermines this line of reasoning. In
general, suppliers of the same ethnicity as the business
owner are not substantially more likely to offer trade
credit. In addition, minority business owners are not
more likely to take up trade credit from a supplier of
the same ethnicity than from a supplier of a different
ethnicity. Thus, the differences across ethnic groups
in the use of trade credit shown in table 8 are not
explained by a simple ethnic relationship between the
supplier and the business owner. For example, a rela-
tively high proportion of Asian owners owe a supplier
for two reasons: because they are likely to be offered
credit, regardless of the ethnicity of the supplier, and
because they are likely to use credit if it is offered,
again regardless of the ethnicity of the supplier.
We gain more information about financial con-
straints for small businesses from two survey ques-
tions dealing with the owners willingness to bear
risk to start another business and how they would
spend an unexpected windfall. Table 9 shows the
aggregated responses to the question, How willing
would you be to risk your house and all your posses-
sions in borrowing money to start another business?
Since we would expect owners nearing retirement age58 Economic Perspectives
to be less willing to undertake a new business, the
figures apply to owners under 55 years of age. (This
will also mute the effect of systematic differences in
age across ethnic groups.) This measure of willing-
ness to bear risk ranges from 37.9 percent for Asian
owners to 69.3 percent for White owners. The propor-
tion of Black owners willing to risk all (49.4 percent)
is somewhat lower than that of Hispanic owners
(60.5 percent).
Table 9 also shows the aggregated responses to
a question on how owners (under age 55) would
spend a windfall gift of $20,000. Economic theory
 predicts that if an entrepreneur is financially uncon-
strained, an increase in assets will have little effect
on the amount of capital invested in the business,
because the business is already operating with the
optimal amount of capital.38 A business owner who is
financially constrained, on the other hand, will use
the windfall to increase the capital employed in the
business. The proportion of owners who say they
would invest the windfall assets in the business
ranges from 38.5 percent for White owners to 78.3
percent for owners in the Other category. The rela-
tively high proportion of owners who make this
response is consistent with the widespread percep-
tion of financial constraints for established business-
es.39 Interestingly, Hispanic owners (62.3 percent) are
more likely to invest the windfall in a business than
Black owners (46.8 percent).
How does this evidence relate to the ethnic differ-
ences in the use of trade credit presented in table 8?
We would expect that owners who are more willing to
risk all on a new business would be more willing to
take on additional ongoing credit. If ongoing credit
constraints are indicated by investing a windfall in
the business, then we would expect more constrained
firms to use more trade credit. However, the results
are not consistent across ethnic groups.
Relative to Hispanic owners, Black owners are
less willing to risk all in a new business and less will-
ing to invest a windfall in a new or existing business.
TABLE 8
Use of trade and other ongoing credit, percent
All Hispanic Black White Asian Other
Owes a supplier—total sample 38.2 44.4 20.1 47.6 66.7 53.8
(393) (176) (135) (24) (32) (25)
A supplier offers credit 56.7 57.6 44.8 74.1 79.8 73.0
(393) (176) (135) (24) (32) (25)
Owes a supplier, credit is offered 66.6 75.3 44.9 64.3 83.6 73.8
(229) (101) (65) (18) (26) (19)
Has credit other than trade credit 17.6 15.5 18.6 16.6 32.7 6.4
(415) (183) (148) (25) (34) (24)
Notes: These results are weighted to reflect sample stratification. Observations are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1993–94,
Little Village Survey and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1997–98, Chatham Survey.
TABLE 9
Measures of entrepreneurial disposition, percent
All Hispanic Black White Asian Other
Willing to risk all on new business 56.6 60.5 49.4 69.3 37.9 69.6
Would invest windfall in business 57.2 62.3 46.8 38.5 48.3 78.3
Observations 304 162 77 13 29 23
Note: Proportion willing to risk all in new business includes those who answered somewhat or very willing
to risk all. The sample was limited to those owners less than 55 years of age.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1993–94,
Little Village Survey and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and University of Chicago, 1997–98, Chatham Survey.59 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
These results are consistent with the finding that
Black owners use less trade credit. Asian owners,
who are generally less likely to be willing to risk all in
a new business and to invest a windfall than most of
the other ethnic groups, are more likely to use trade
credit, which is the opposite of what we would expect.
Thus, these indicators of willingness to bear risk
and invest a windfall are consistent with the Black
Hispanic differences in the use of trade credit, but
not consistent with the relatively heavy use of trade
credit by Asian owners.
Conclusion
Our results confirm the importance of personal
savings and informal sources of credit in meeting the
need for start-up funding for small businesses. Credit
from financial institutions is little used by small enter-
prises in the start-up phase. There are pronounced
ethnic differences in the amount of start-up funding
used by businesses in our sample. In particular, we
find that Black owners start their businesses with sig-
nificantly less capital than Hispanic owners. After ad-
justing for industry type and some demographic and
human capital variables, we estimate that a Black
owner uses about one-half of the start-up capital
obtained by a comparable Hispanic owner. When
we look at the sources of funding, we find that the
BlackHispanic gap in total start-up funding is due
more to differences in the use of informal sources of
funding than in the amount of personal savings put
up by the owner. We also find that Black owners are
much less likely to owe their suppliers than owners in
the other ethnic groups. The evidence indicates that
Black owners are somewhat less likely to be offered
credit by suppliers and that they are much less likely
to use trade credit if it is offered. This result can not
be explained by comparing the ethnicity of owners
and their suppliers.
The importance of informal sources of funding
suggests that it is worth exploring ways to combine
the presumed flexibility and informational advantages
of informal networks with the formal sectors ability
to mobilize capital. Community development financial
institutions and micro-lending pools are examples of
institutions that, in some ways, combine the
strengths of formal and informal sources of capital.
The ethnic differences in the amount of capital
used and the sources of capital illustrate the importance
of learning more about how formal and informal capi-
tal and credit markets work with regard to ethnic net-
works and ethnic neighborhoods. These results have
important implications for ethnic differences in business
survival and growth, the decision to become self-
employed, and income and wealth accumulation.40
NOTES
1Empirical tests of the presence of liquidity constraints can be
found in Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfa-
ian, and Rosen (1994a,b). Note that liquidity constraints were
found for White males and higher-income individuals in these
studies. Presumably, constraints would be even more evident
for minority groups.
2Evidence for a positive relationship between start-up capital
and survival and growth can be found in Brüderl and Preisendörfer
(1998) for a sample of German businesses and Bates (1990,
1991) for a sample of Black and White owners in 1982.
3Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) examine a national sample
of small businesses and find that minorities fare worse than
Whites in some respects. See Munnell et al. (1996) for an influ-
ential study of discrimination in mortgage markets.
4See Bond and Townsend (1996), Raijman (1996), and Tienda
and Raijman (1996) for a description and some findings from
the Little Village Surveys for households and businesses.
5The survey fieldwork was conducted during 199394 in Little
Village and 199798 in Chatham.
6White, Asian, and Other owners are represented in both Little
Village and Chatham, but Black owners are almost exclusively
located in Chatham and Hispanic owners in Little Village.
7It is important to note that all the results presented here are
conditioned on the survival of businesses to the survey date.
8The average start-up costs for firms owned by Whites, Asians,
and Others are statistically different from Hispanic firms at
the 10 percent level of significance or less (based on a t-test).
9The significance level for the t-test of the difference in means
between Hispanic- and Black-owned firms started from scratch
is 26 percent; the corresponding figure for bought or acquired
firms is 32 percent.
10Preliminary regression analysis established that splitting the
sample according to how the business was started results in eco-
nomically and statistically significant differences in coefficient
estimates. Thus, we report regression results for the split sample.
11This would be the case if some industries require start-up costs
that are lumpy in the sense of not being completely adjustable.
An example would be a manufacturing process that requires a
particular piece of equipment to be economically viable.
12Some sample selection issues are raised by the fact that the
sample includes firms that by definition have survived to the
survey date. Another reason to include a trend term is as a
crude way of accounting for the possibility that older firms
 survive because they begin with more start-up financing. A
variable capturing the state of the business cycle at start-up
was found to be without value in preliminary regressions.60 Economic Perspectives
13The logged value of the estimated start-up costs (9.92398) is
calculated as follows: Estimated costs = Intercept + Proficient
in English coefficient + Owners age coefficient × 37 years +
Years since start-up coefficient × 12 years. The values for
owners age and years since start-up are sample means.
14For example, the logged value of start-up costs for a Black
owner (9.315061) is calculated by adding the Black coefficient
(0.608927) to the baseline logged value (9.92398). This value
converted to dollars equals $11,104.
15It is possible that the ethnic differences noted here partly re-
flect location or neighborhood differences. We are not able to
test this directly for Black and Hispanic owners because they
are not represented in both neighborhoods. The results of a re-
gression analysis for White, Asian, and Other owners (who are
represented in both neighborhoods) indicate that the location
effect is economically small and statistically insignificant.
16The differences between Blacks and all other ethnic groups
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, or less.
17The differences between Blacks and all other ethnic groups
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, or less.
18The differences in start-up funding implied by the coefficients
for college degree and proficiency in English are somewhat
larger than the difference between Black and Hispanic owners
discussed above.
19The coefficient for female is positive but not statistically
significant at the usual confidence levels.
20We do not use an OLS regression because a number of busi-
nesses report using no start-up funding from personal savings,
thus piling up observations on the lower bound of zero. We use
a tobit estimation to take this into account. See Greene (1997,
pp. 962974).
21In fact, these regressions provide evidence that owners in the
White and Other categories use less start-up funding from per-
sonal resources than Black and Hispanic owners.
22Although the ethnic differences in nonpersonal funding tend
to be economically large, they generally are not statistically
significant because of high standard errors, probably due to the
relatively small number of observations.
23Data from the 1982 Characteristics of Business Owners
Survey confirm that these general findings apply to a national
sample of businesses. Asian owners were more likely to have
obtained loans or equity from friends and family than Black
and Hispanic owners, and, in turn, Hispanics obtained more
than Blacks. See Bates (1989) and Fratoe (1988).
24Comparison of the means of the logged amounts of start-up
funding for the various sources of funding provides the same
picture as the mean proportions discussed here. The means of
logged funding from informal and other sources are higher for
Hispanic-owned businesses than for Black-owned businesses, and
the means of logged funding from personal and formal sources
are higher for Black owners. Splitting the sample into businesses
that were started from scratch and those that were bought or ac-
quired does not affect the general results presented here.
25We use a tobit regression because profit is not reported for
businesses in Little Village that lost money the previous year,
resulting in censored observations. The coefficient for start-
up funding is statistically significant for the specification in
levels but not for the semi-log and log-log versions. The results
are only suggestive in that we do not account for the selection
effects of having only ongoing firms in our sample.
26The assumption that the borrowing constraint depends on
personal assets can be found in standard models of entrepre-
neurial choice, such as Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a). Avery, Bostic, and
Samolyk (1998) find that personal collateral and guarantees
are widely used as backing for small business loans. However,
they find no consistent relationship between wealth and the
use of these personal commitments.
27Education and other human capital variables plausibly capture
differences in permanent income. However, Blau and Graham
(1990), Smith (1995), and Menchik and Jianakoplos (1997)
provide evidence indicating that income and demographic vari-
ables do not fully explain BlackWhite differences in wealth.
28Smith (1995) reports that the coefficients for Black and
Hispanic indicator variables in mean and median wealth regres-
sions are quite similar, indicating that relative to White house-
holds, Black and Hispanic households have similar levels of
wealth conditioned on the variables included in the regression.
These results are based on the Health and Retirement Study
and so reflect the experience of older households.
29The figures come from the 1993 National Survey of Small
Business Finance, which defines small businesses as those with
fewer than 500 employees. See Cole and Wolken (1995, table
A.2) and Berger and Udell (1998, table 1) for the cited figures
on the use of trade credit.
30See Petersen and Rajan (1996) and Mian and Smith (1992)
for discussions of the theory and practice of managing trade
credit.
31The statistical significance is based on a logit regression using
the ethnic variables. The ethnic differences noted here remain
after controlling for a number of factors that might matter for
the use of trade credit. We test this using a logit regression, in-
cluding the ethnic variables, industry types, and human capital
and demographic variables used in the regressions on total
start-up costs reported above. In addition, we include the age
of the business (logged) and the number of employees (logged)
to account for some of the differences among the ongoing
businesses. A tobit regression of the log of the dollar amount
of trade credit shows that Black owners owe significantly less
taking these variables into account.
32After controlling for industry types, human capital and demo-
graphic variables, and business characteristics in a logit regres-
sion using Hispanic owners as the reference group, only the
HispanicAsian ethnic difference is statistically significant. If
Black owners are the reference group, Black owners are statis-
tically significantly less likely to be offered credit than Asian
and Other owners.
33The ethnic differences between Black owners and owners in
the other ethnic categories reported here are statistically sig-
nificant, with the exception of the difference between Black
and White owners. This result also holds after controlling for
industry types, human capital variables, and business charac-
teristics.
34Figures from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business
Finances (Cole and Wolken, 1995). The cited figure does not
include credit card debt.61 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
35The difference in the proportion of Asian owners who use
other credit relative to Hispanic owners is statistically signifi-
cant. However, the difference is no longer significant after con-
trolling for the industry types, human capital and demographic
variables, and business characteristics in a logit regression.
36Some businesses list more than one lender.
37In the case of corporate suppliers for which there is no clear
ethnic identity, the ethnicity of the contact person is reported.
38See Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a) for an exam-
ple of a model that applies to an entrepreneur facing a liquidity
constraint.
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